CDStore is a unified, multicloud storage solution for users to outsource backup data with reliability, security, and cost-efficiency guarantees. CDStore builds on an augmented secret-sharing scheme called convergent dispersal, which supports deduplication by using deterministic, content-derived hashes as input to secret sharing. CDStore's design is presented here, with an emphasis on how it combines convergent dispersal with two-stage deduplication to achieve both bandwidth and storage savings while robustly diverting side-channel attacks (launched by malicious users on the client side). a cost analysis shows that CDStore yields significant savings over baseline cloud storage solutions.
M
ulticloud storage coalesces multiple public cloud storage services, operated by independent vendors, into a single storage pool. By dispersing data with some form of redundancy across multiple clouds, multicloud storage provides a plausible way to realize reliable and secure outsourced storage. By reliable, we mean that the stored data remain available even in the presence of cloud failures; by secure, we mean that the stored data are protected with guarantees of confidentiality (the data are kept secret from unauthorized parties) and integrity (the data remain uncorrupted).
Secret sharing is a form of redundancy that provides both reliability and security guarantees. The method has been realized in multicloud storage. [1] [2] [3] [4] Given the configuration parameters r, k, and n (where r < k < n), secret sharing transforms a data input (called secret) into n coded outputs (called shares), such that the secret can be recovered with any k out of n shares, and the secret can't be inferred if only r shares are available. Secret sharing often comes with high redundancy. For example, Adi Shamir's scheme 5 has the same storage overhead as replication. However, it's plausible to reduce the redundancy of secret sharing to be slightly higher than that of erasure coding, while preserving security in the computational sense. 4 Existing secret-sharing algorithms, though, prohibit storage savings achieved by deduplication, which works by keeping only one physical data copy and having it shared by other copies with identical content. Field measurements show that deduplication is especially effective for workloads with high content similarity, such as backups. 6 On the other hand, secret sharing uses random input seeds to generate shares. If users embed different random input seeds, their shares will differ and can't be deduplicated, even though their original data are identical.
Motivated by users' perspectives, here we present CDStore, which provides a unified, multicloud storage solution with reliability, security, and cost-efficiency guarantees. CDStore builds on an enhanced secret-sharing scheme called convergent dispersal; its core idea is to replace the random input seeds of traditional secret sharing with deterministic cryptographic hashes derived from the original data, while the hashes can't be inferred by attackers without knowing the whole original data. Thus, identical secrets are always transformed into identical shares, which can be deduplicated. We believe that unifying secret sharing and deduplication is beneficial for cloud storage: secret sharing provides reliability and security guarantees, while deduplication provides cost-efficiency guarantees by offsetting the dispersal-level redundancy of secret sharing with the removal of content-level redundancy.
The work presented in this article is an extension to our conference paper, 7 in which we discussed the design and implementation details of CDStore and presented its performance results based on testbed experiments. Here, we provide detailed cost breakdown analysis, and show how CDStore significantly saves monetary costs over baseline cloud storage solutions (for example, by more than 70 percent in some cases). The source code of our CDStore prototype is available at http://ansrlab.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/software/cdstore.
CDStore Design
CDStore is designed for an organization to outsource the storage of data of a large group of users to multiple clouds. It builds on the clientserver architecture (see Figure 1) . Each user from the same organization runs a CDStore client to store and access his data in multiple clouds over the Internet. In each cloud, a colocated virtual machine (VM) instance owned by the organization runs a CDStore server between multiple CDStore clients and the storage backend.
CDStore targets backup workloads, which are known to have high content similarity. 6 We consider a type of backups obtained by snapshotting applications, file systems, or virtual disk images. In CDStore deployment, each user machine submits a series of backup files (for example, in Unix tar format) to the co-located CDStore client, which processes the backups and uploads them to the CDStore servers in all clouds.
Goals and Assumptions
We state the design goals and assumptions of CDStore in three aspects: reliability, security, and cost efficiency.
Reliability. CDStore tolerates failures of cloud storage providers and even CDStore servers. Outsourced data are accessible if a tolerable number of clouds (and their co-located CDStore servers) are operational. CDStore also tolerates client-side failures by offloading metadata management to the server side. In the presence of cloud failures, CDStore decodes original secrets and then rebuilds any lost share (similar to Reed-Solomon codes); 8 we don't consider cost-efficient recovery here. 9 Security. CDStore ensures the confidentiality and integrity of outsourced data, as long as a tolerable number of clouds are uncompromised. Note that the confidentiality guarantee requires that the secrets be drawn from a large message space, so that brute-force attacks are infeasible. 10 CDStore also avoids side-channel attacks 11, 12 via two-stage deduplication. Here, we don't consider strong attack models, such as Byzantine faults in cloud services. 1 We also assume that the client-server 
Convergent Dispersal
Convergent dispersal enables secret sharing with deduplication by replacing the embedded random input seed with a deterministic cryptographic hash derived from the secret. Thus, two secrets with identical content must generate identical shares, making deduplication possible. Also, it's computationally infeasible to infer the hash without knowing the whole secret. Our idea is inspired by convergent encryption 13 used in traditional key-based encryption, in which the random key is replaced by the cryptographic hash of the data to be encrypted. Figure 2 shows the main idea of how we augment a secret-sharing algorithm with convergent dispersal.
Here, we present a convergent dispersal instantiation based on an existing secret sharing scheme called AONT-RS, 4 which combines Rivest's all-ornothing transform (AONT) 14 for confidentiality and Reed-Solomon coding 8 for fault tolerance. We call our convergent dispersal instantiation CAONT-RS, which aims to inherit the reliability and security properties of the original AONT-RS, and makes two key modifications. First, to improve performance, CAONT-RS replaces Rivest's AONT 14 with another AONT based on optimal asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP). 15 The rationale is that Rivest's AONT performs multiple encryptions on smallsize words, while OAEP-based AONT performs a single encryption on a large-size, constant-value block. Also, OAEP-based AONT provably provides no worse security than any AONT scheme. 15 Second, CAONT-RS replaces the random input seed in AONT with a deterministic cryptographic hash derived from the secret. Thus, it preserves content similarity in dispersed shares and allows deduplication.
We elaborate the encoding and decoding of CAONT-RS, both of which are performed by a CDStore client. Figure 3 shows an example of CAONT-RS with n = 4, k = 3. Also, CAONT-RS has r = k -1 = 2, as in AONT-RS. Encoding. We first transform a given secret X into a CAONT package. Specifically, we first generate a hash key h, instead of a random key, derived from X using an (optionally salted) hash function H (for example, SHA-256):
(1) Figure 2 . Convergent dispersal. During the encoding of secret sharing, the embedded random input seed is replaced with a deterministic cryptographic hash derived from the secret. 
Figure 3. Example of convergent all-or-nothing transform with Reed-Solomon coding (CAONT-RS) with
To achieve confidentiality, we transform (X, h) into a CAONT package (Y, t) using OAEP-based AONT, where Y and t are the head and tail parts of the CAONT package and have the same size as X and h, respectively. To elaborate, Y is generated by
where ⊕ is the XOR operator and G is a generator function that takes h as input and constructs a mask block with the same size as X. Here, we implement the generator G as
where C is a constant-value block with the same size as X, and E is an encryption function (for example, AES-256) that encrypts C using h as the encryption key. The tail part t is generated by
Finally, we divide the CAONT package into k equal-size shares (if we need to, we pad zeroes to the secret to ensure that the CAONT package can be evenly divided). We encode them into n shares using the systematic Reed-Solomon codes. 8 To enable deduplication, we ensure that the same share is located in the same cloud. Because the number of clouds for multicloud storage is usually small, we simply disperse the shares to all clouds. Suppose that CDStore spans n clouds, which we label 0, 1, … , n − 1. After encoding each secret using convergent dispersal, we label the n generated shares 0, 1, … , n − 1 in the order of their positions in the Reed-Solomon encoding result, such that share i is to be stored on cloud i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. This ensures that the same cloud always receives the same share from the secrets with identical content, either generated by the same user or different users. This also enables us to easily locate the shares during restore.
Decoding. To recover the secret, we retrieve any k out of n shares and use them to reconstruct the original CAONT package (Y, t); note that the retrieval size is slightly more than the original secret size by the size of h. Then we deduce hash h by XORing t with H(Y ) -see Equation 3 . Finally, we deduce secret X by XORing Y with G(h) -see Equation 2 -and remove any padded zeroes introduced in encoding.
We can also verify the integrity of the deduced secret X. We simply generate a hash value from the deduced X (as in Equation 1 ) and compare if it matches h. If the match fails, then we consider the decoded secret corrupted.
Remarks. Let's briefly consider the security properties of CAONT-RS. CAONT-RS ensures confidentiality, provided that an attacker can't gain unauthorized accesses to k out of n clouds, and ensures integrity through the embedded hash in each secret. It leverages AONT to ensure that no information of the original secret can be inferred from fewer than k shares. We note that an attacker can identify the shares of different users and perform brute-force dictionary attacks 10 inside the clouds, and thus we require that the secrets be drawn from a large message space. To mitigate brute-force attacks, we might replace the hash key in CAONT-RS with a more sophisticated key generated by a key server, 10 with the tradeoff of introducing the key management overhead.
Two-Stage Deduplication
We first overview how deduplication works. Deduplication divides data into fixed-size or variable-size chunks. Each chunk is uniquely identified by a fingerprint computed by a cryptographic hash of the chunk content. Two chunks are said to be identical if their fingerprints are the same, and fingerprint collisions of two different chunks are assumed to be unlikely. Deduplication stores only one copy of a chunk, and refers any duplicate chunks to the copy via small-size references.
To realize deduplication in cloud storage, a naive approach is to perform global deduplication on the client side. Specifically, before a user uploads data to a cloud, it first generates fingerprints of the data. The method then checks the cloud using the fingerprint for the existence of any duplicate data that has been uploaded by any user. Finally, it uploads only the unique data to the cloud. Although client-side global deduplication saves upload bandwidth and storage overhead, it's susceptible to side-channel attacks that can be launched by a malicious user. 11, 12 One attack is to infer the existence of data of other users. 12 Specifically, an attacker generates the fingerprints of some possible data of other users and queries the cloud by fingerprint if such data are unique and need to be uploaded. If no upload is needed, then the attacker infers that other users own the data. Another attack is to gain unauthorized access to other users' data. 11 Specifically, an attacker uses the fingerprints of some sensitive data of other users to convince the cloud of data ownership.
CDStore prevents side-channel attacks through two-stage deduplication, which eliminates duplicates first on the client side and then on the server side. Suppose that each CDStore server maintains a deduplication index that keeps track of which shares have been stored by each user and how shares are deduplicated. Then we implement the two deduplication stages as follows.
Intrauser deduplication. A CDStore client first runs deduplication only on the data owned by the same user, and uploads the unique user data to the cloud. Before uploading shares to a cloud, the CDStore client first checks with the CDStore server by fingerprint if it has already uploaded the same shares. Specifically, the CDStore client first sends the fingerprints generated from the shares to the CDStore server. The CDStore server then looks up its deduplication index, and replies to the CDStore client with a list of share identifiers that indicate which shares have been uploaded by the CDStore client. Finally, the CDStore client uploads only unique shares to the cloud based on the list.
Interuser deduplication. A CDStore server runs deduplication on all users' data and stores the globally unique data in the storage backend. After the CDStore server receives shares from the CDStore client, it generates a fingerprint from each share (instead of using the one generated by the CDStore client for intrauser deduplication), and checks if the share has already been stored by other users by looking up the deduplication index. It stores only the unique shares that aren't yet stored at the storage backend. It also updates the deduplication index to keep track of which user owns the shares. Here, we can't directly use the fingerprint generated by the CDStore client for intrauser deduplication. Otherwise, an attacker can launch a side-channel attack, by using the fingerprint of a share of other users to gain unauthorized access to the share. Remarks. Two-stage deduplication forces a user to upload shares that might have been uploaded by another user and hence avoiding client-side interuser deduplication. 12 It makes deduplication patterns independent across users' uploads, so an attacker can't infer the data content of other users through deduplication occurrences. Both intrauser and interuser deduplications effectively remove duplicates. Intrauser deduplication eliminates duplicates of the same user's data -for example, when a user makes repeated backups of the same application or file system. Interuser deduplication further removes duplicates of multiple users -for example, when the machines of multiple users of the same organization share the same operating system configurations. 16 The removal of duplicates translates to cost savings.
Implementation Details
We implemented a CDStore prototype based on the client-server model in Figure 1 . Here, we highlight the important implementation details of CDStore; the full details are in our conference paper. Chunking. CDStore can perform deduplication on fixed-or variable-size chunks. We implement variable-size chunking based on Rabin fingerprinting. 17 Here, we set the size of each secret (chunk) on the order of kilobytes to effectively remove duplicates. For example, our default average chunk size is 8 Kbytes.
Server-side metadata management. We make CDStore servers keep and manage all metadata on behalf of CDStore clients, which are generally less reliable. There are two types of metadata: file metadata, which describe file information, and share metadata, which describe each unique share being stored. We distribute the metadata across all CDStore servers for reliability.
In particular, we encode and disperse file pathnames, which are considered to be sensitive metadata, via CAONT-RS. Each CDStore server stores both file and share metadata at the storage backend, and keeps the respective file and share indices in local index structures to reference metadata.
Container management. CDStore mitigates I/O overheads by arranging storage in units of containers. We have two types of containers: share containers, which hold unique shares, and recipe containers, which hold file recipes (that is, the complete file descriptions). All shares and file recipes are packed into respective containers, with a default size of 4 Mbytes each. www.computer.org/internet/ IEEE INTERNET COmPUTING
Multithreading. We exploit multithreading to parallelize intensive operations. For example, we parallelize the encoding and decoding operations of CAONT-RS: in file uploads, we pass each secret output to one of the threads for encoding; in file downloads, we pass the received shares of a secret to a thread for decoding. Also, we use multiple threads for communications to fully use the network transfer bandwidth.
Cost Analysis
We present a detailed cost breakdown analysis on how CDStore saves monetary costs over baseline cloud storage solutions. Our conference paper 7 also presents performance results of CDStore based on testbed experiments.
Cost Components
We first characterize the cost components of CDStore. Our analysis is based on the tiered price plans of four cloud providers in November 2015: Amazon Singapore (https://aws.amazon.com/ pricing/services), Google Asia (https://cloud. google.com/pricing), Azure Southeast Asia (https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing), and Rackspace Hong Kong (www.rackspace. com/cloud/public-pricing). Free charges apply to inbound transfers to VM instances as well as data transfers between colocated VM instances and cloud storage. We now break down the total backup cost incurred by CDStore in two aspects.
• VM cost. The VM cost is the fee charged for running VM instances for hosting CDStore servers. The VM cost has two parts: running cost, which is the total fee paid for running VM instances based on actual usage; and transfer cost, which charges the outbound transferred data from the VMs to CDStore clients (for example, when a CDStore server informs a CDStore client of what unique shares need to be uploaded).
• Backend cost. The backend cost is the fee charged for storage. We consider backend cost in two parts: storage cost, which charges the data storage for unique shares and file recipes; and request cost, which charges the storage requests (such as PUT and GET).
As an example, Table 1 shows the price plans of Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) ondemand instances and Simple Storage Service (S3) for our calculations of the VM and backend costs, respectively. (Table 1 only lists the essential items for our analysis.) Note that Amazon provides less-expensive pricing options. For example, EC2 offers reserved instances that allow significant discounts for long-term usage, while charging upfront payments for resource reservations; Glacier (https://aws.amazon.com/ glacier/pricing) only charges one-third of Amazon S3's storage cost, but with a higher retrieval cost. In addition, the price plans vary across cloud providers. In particular, Rackspace charges the highest storage cost among the four providers, yet its request cost is free of charge. How to harness different pricing options for further cost savings is an important future work.
In practice, we reclaim the space of expired data to avoid unlimited data growth. Our analysis assumes that CDStore arranges containers by the backup time, so each container keeps either all active data, or all expired data. CDStore simply issues DELETE requests to expired containers. 
Case Study
We analyze the monthly backup cost of CDStore, and elaborate our calculations via a case study. We derive our parameters from the backup datasets in EMC's field study. 6 The datasets cover up to 200 Tbytes of pre-deduplicated data. The deduplication ratio ranges from 2× to 14×. The retention time ranges from three days to three years. The study also indicates that backup files are of large size, possibly more than 100 Gbytes.
In our case study, suppose that an organization schedules weekly backups for its user data. Let the weekly backup size be 16 Tbytes per week, the deduplication ratio be 10×, the retention time be 26 weeks (about six months), and the average file size and average chunk (secret) size be 100 Gbytes and 8 Kbytes, respectively. We fix (n, k) = (4, 3) for the four different cloud providers we consider. We assume that each CDStore server is always online, and each CDStore client has an average upload bandwidth of 15 Mbytes per second (Mbps). We now explain how we derive each cost component.
VM cost.
We first examine the running cost. Our goal is to choose the cheapest VM based on two principles: CPU core principle, in which there are enough CPU cores to serve CDStore clients; and VM storage principle, in which a VM can keep all file and share indices locally, according to the estimated storage size and deduplication efficiency.
For the CPU core principle, we measure the average number of CDStore clients that it can serve concurrently by dividing the amount of backup data (for example, 16 Tbytes/week) by the per-client upload bandwidth (15 Mbps), so we have 1.85. If we use one CPU core to serve each CDStore client and reserve one additional CPU core for the main thread of a CDStore server, then we need at least three CPU cores here.
For the VM storage principle, we compute the average number of files managed in a VM by dividing the total amount of backups (let's say 416 Tbytes over six months) by the average file size (100 Gbytes), so we have around 4,260 files. We also compute the average number of unique shares managed in a VM by dividing the amount of unique data being stored after deduplication (that is, 41.6 Tbytes for 10× deduplication ratio) by the average chunk size (8 Kbytes), so we have around 5.58 × 10 9 shares. In our CDStore implementation, the file and share index entry sizes are 64 bytes and 72 bytes, respectively. Thus, we need around 370 Gbytes of VM local storage.
Based on the previous derivations, we choose the VM type with four CPUs and 800 Gbytes of storage for Amazon EC2 (see Table 1 ), whose monthly running cost is around US$740 (that is, $1.018/hour × 24 × 365/12). Similarly, we can derive the monthly running costs for Google ($180), Azure ($700), and Rackspace ($1,620).
The transfer cost of CDStore is actually quite small. It's charged when a CDStore server informs a CDStore client of what shares need to be uploaded, such that each share identifier can be embedded in a single byte. For 16 Tbytes of weekly backups, the monthly transfer cost of each VM is only around $1.
Backend cost. We first examine the backend storage cost, which depends on the amounts of unique shares and file recipes being stored in each cloud. For unique shares, we divide the total amount of unique data being stored after deduplication (that is, 41.6 Tbytes for a 10× deduplication ratio) divided by k (that is, 3), so we have 13.87 Tbytes per cloud. (For simplicity, we assume that the redundancy for fault tolerance is n/k. Note that the storage redundancy of AONT-RS, 4 on which CDStore builds, is slightly larger than n/k, but the difference is small and has limited impact on our cost results.) For file recipes, our implementation contains 16- 
Cost Results
We evaluate the monthly costs of CDStore. We considered the same setting in the previous "Case Study" section, except that we now vary the weekly backup size and deduplication ratio. We compare CDStore with two baseline cloud storage systems that don't support deduplication: an AONT-RS-based multicloud system that achieves the same fault tolerance and security as CDStore; and a single-cloud system that incurs zero redundancy for fault tolerance, but encrypts user data with random keys. Both baseline systems incur no VM cost, and we assume that they have zero storage costs due to metadata and zero request costs. For the CDStore and AONT-RS-based multicloud system, we use the tiered price plans of Amazon, Google, Azure, and Rackspace; for the single-cloud system, we compute the cost of each of the four cloud providers and present the average. We show that even though CDStore introduces redundancy for fault tolerance and VMs for deduplication management, it still achieves cost savings through deduplication. Figure 4 shows the monthly costs of the cloud storage systems. Figure 4a shows the monthly costs versus different weekly backup sizes, while we fix the deduplication ratio as 10×. CDStore incurs a higher cost than the baseline systems for the weekly backup size less than 1 Tbyte due to the VM cost, but achieves cost savings when the weekly backup size increases. For example, for the weekly backup size of 64 Tbytes, CDStore has a monthly cost of $20,600, while those of the AONT-RS and single-cloud systems are $90,000 and $64,000 (that is, 77 and 68 percent in savings from CDStore), respectively. Note that the jagged curve of CDStore is caused by switching to the cheapest VM instance. Figure 4b shows the monthly costs of the cloud storage systems versus different deduplication ratios, while we fix the weekly backup size as 16 Tbytes. The cost of CDStore decreases with the increase of the deduplication ratio, yet those of both baseline systems remain unchanged. For the deduplication ratio 50×, CDStore incurs a monthly cost of only $1,950, and achieves 92 and 89 percent savings when compared to the AONT-RS-based ($23,200) and single-cloud systems ($17,000), respectively. Thus, CDStore achieves high cost savings over the baseline systems for large weekly backup sizes and large deduplication ratios. Figure 5 presents the breakdown of the monthly costs of CDStore, in terms of the VM and backend costs. Figure 5a shows the results versus different weekly backup sizes, while we fix the deduplication ratio as 10×. The VM cost is higher than the backend cost when the weekly backup size is small, yet the backend cost will become dominant as the weekly backup size increases. Figure 5b shows the results versus different deduplication ratios, while we fix the weekly backup size as 16 Tbytes. Both the VM and backend costs decrease as the deduplication ratio increases.
Our analysis here focuses on the backup cost, with brief consideration given to the restore cost of CDStore. To restore a backup, a CDStore client downloads slightly more data than the original backup size to decode the original secrets. The restore cost of CDStore is the sum of outbound transfer costs of k clouds; if all clouds have the 
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DStore is a multicloud storage system for organizations to outsource backup and archival storage to public cloud vendors. Our cost analysis demonstrates that CDStore achieves significant cost savings via deduplication. In future work, we'll consider building a new cloud storage service based on CDStore and addressing more engineering issues.
